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THE HIDDEN COST OF ROD AND RIFLE: WHY STATE FISH
AND GAME LAWS MUST BE AMENDED IN ORDER TO
PROTECT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE IN THE GREAT OUTDOORS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Recreational anglers 1 and hunters assume many burdens before
casting a line or taking aim from a tree stand. 2 For example,
Maryland requires licenses/ limits activity to specific seasons,4 and
places restrictions on equipment5 as conditions to recreational
hunting and fishing. Beyond these expected burdens, however, an
unanticipated cost has emerged that threatens anglers' and hunters'
Fourth Amendment privacy rights. From California's piers to the
Montanan wilderness to even the calm waters of the Chesapeake Bay,
hunters and anglers are subjected to warrantless searches by game
wardens, often without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any
game violation. 6
At first blush, these kinds of intrusions on an individual's privacy
would appear to directly contravene well-established protections
under the Fourth Amendment. 7 State courts, however, have upheld
warrantless administrative searches of anglers' and hunters' boats,
vehicles, and storage containers as valid under the United States
Constitution. 8
I.
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

"Angling," is a method of fishing with a hook and line, and an "angler" is one who
fishes by "angling." MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 97A.015, subdiv. 2 (West 2009).
Tree stands allow hunters to observe and hunt deer from a hidden vantage point up in
a tree. See Basic Treestand Hunting Techniques, OUTDOOR ADVENTURES NETWORK,
http://www.myoan.net/huntingart/deer_stand_techniques.html (last visited June 10,
2013).
See MD. CoDE ANN., NAT. REs. § 10-306 (LexisNexis 2007) (establishing a hunting
license requirement); id. § 4-610 (establishing a fishing license requirement).
See id. § 4-603 (providing for fishing seasons); id. § 10-415 (providing for deer
hunting season).
See, e.g., id. § 10-426 (prohibiting hunting with a gun or device via Internet
connection); id. § 10-418 (requiring specific outerwear for hunters); id. § 4-617
(prohibiting angling with certain types of lines and lures).
See infra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part Ill. A.
See, e.g., People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 256, 262-63 (Cal. 2011) (upholding
warrantless administrative stop and search of defendant's vehicle after warden
observed defendant fishing lobster); State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2003)
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Under the administrative search exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, game wardens may perform
warrantless administrative searches without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion of a violation, simply because hunting and
fishing are closely regulated activities. 9 Consequently, even though
anglers and hunters are private citizens engaged in seemingly
innocuous recreational activities, they are subject to the same
warrantless intrusions on their privacy as firearms dealers or mine
operators. 10
Although it is crucial for states to be able to enforce their fish and
game laws and preserve wildlife populations for subsequent
generations, 11 basic privacy protections should not have to face
extinction as a result. 12 Unfortunately, the vitality of the warrantless
administrative search exception for closely regulated activities has
greatly diminished anglers' and hunters' privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment. 13 Rather than rely on privacy protections under
the Constitution, the best remedy for anglers and hunters to preserve
their privacy rights is through legislation that would limit game
wardens' search and seizure authority under state fish and game
laws. 14
This comment will explore how explicitly defining game wardens'
search and seizure powers under state fish and game laws would be
the most practical means to preserve hunters' and anglers' privacy
rights, notwithstanding the warrantless administrative search
exception to the Fourth Amendment. 15 Specifically, this comment
will propose that game wardens may stop suspected anglers and
hunters to demand exhibition of licenses and any fish or game that

9.
10.

II.

12.
13.
14.
15.

(holding that game warden was entitled to search defendant's boat despite no
suspicion of fishing violation); State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 773, 779 (Mont. 2002)
(upholding warrantless search of defendant's live well fish container).
See infra Part II.B.
Compare Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 2, 9 (upholding warrantless administrative search
on recreational angler), and Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256, 262-63 (upholding warrantless
administrative stop and search of defendant's vehicle after warden observed defendant
fishing lobster), with Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981) (upholding
warrantless administrative searches in the mining industry), and United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972)(upholding warrantless administrative searches
against an arms dealer).
See Scott Witty, It's a Keeper: Preserving Minnesota's Recreational Fishing by
Allowing Effective Regulatory Enforcement, 26 HAMLINE J. Pus. L. & POL'Y 151, 154
(2004).
See infra Part III.C.l.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.C.l-2.
See infra Part III.C.l.
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the person possesses, but a more intrusive administrative search could
be performed only if the game warden develops independent
suspicion of a violation. 16
Part II provides background on the development of the
administrative search exception to the traditional warrant requirement
under the Fourth Amendment, tracing its expansion from the use of
less stringent administrative warrants to the execution of warrantless
administrative searches whenever an activity is closely regulated. 17
Additionally, Part II addresses how the warrantless administrative
search exception has been applied against anglers and hunters in
states across the country to permit warrantless searches and
seizures. 18
Part III discusses why previous challenges to the exception's
constitutionality, in the fish and game context, have failed, 19 and
examines why state constitutional amendments purporting to expand
citizens' privacy rights would likely be insufficient to protect hunters
and anglers. 20
Expanding upon the Supreme Court of California's interpretation
of California's fish and game laws in People v. Maikhio/ 1 Part III
argues that limiting game wardens' administrative search and seizure
powers through more specific state laws would be the most
reasonable method for striking a proper balance between wildlife
protection and privacy rights. 22 Lastly, Part III will analyze
Maryland's fish and game laws and propose legislative amendments
to ensure that outdoors enthusiasts' rights are preserved in proper
balance with the state's interest in wildlife preservation. 23

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part III.C.l-2.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III. A.
See infra Part III.B.
People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247 (Cal. 2011).
See infra Part III. C.!.
See infra Part III.C.2.
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II.

THE EXPANSION OF WARRANTLESS ADMINISTRATIVE
SEARCHES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
RECREATIONAL FISHING AND HUNTING LAW
ENFORCEMENT

A.

From Camara to Burger: Warrantless Administrative Searches
under the Fourth Amendment

Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 24 In order for Fourth
Amendment protections to apply, the individual searched must have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. 25 Generally,
police must obtain a warrant or have probable cause before
performing a search or seizure. 26 However, courts recognize that
when there is a reduced expectation of privacy in the area to be
searched, the traditional warrant and probable cause requirements are
relaxed. 27
Despite the Fourth Amendment's seemingly clear wording,
exceptions to the warrant requirement abound. 28 The administrative
search exception-first established by the United States Supreme
Court in Camara v. Municipal Court--originally provided for less
stringent administrative warrants to perform regulatory inspections,
rather than require the traditional search warrants used by police. 29
Under Camara, the Court recognized that when state inspections
are aimed at citywide compliance with a regulatory scheme, rather
than a criminal investigation, an administrative warrant need not be
issued by a judge and need not be supported by probable cause. 30

24.

25.
26.
27.

28.

29.
30.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 707, 712 (1987) (upholding warrantless
inspection because operator of vehicle dismantling business had a diminished
expectation of privacy).
See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35-36 (1979) (search incident to
arrest); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (fixed internal
border checkpoints); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (hot pursuit);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (stop and frisk).
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967).
Jd. at 535-36.
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Instead, administrative warrants could be issued by the pertinent
administrative agencyY Accordingly, the Court indicated that,
although administrative inspections implicate Fourth Amendment
privacy rights, the level of the intrusion and the lack of satisfactory
alternatives to enforcement render the exception necessary. 32
After establishing administrative warrants as a means to ensure
regulatory enforcement, the Supreme Court subsequently recognized
an exception for warrantless administrative searches for certain types
of industries. 33 Under the "closely regulated" business exception to
the administrative warrant, the Court recognized that some
administrative agencies need the ability to conduct surprise
inspections in order to enforce regulations on businesses that have a
pervasive history of regulation. 34
In Donovan v. Dewey, the Court further relaxed the warrantless
administrative search standards. 35
There, the Court upheld
warrantless administrative searches of a coal mine, despite the fact
that coal mining did not have a long history of pervasive regulation. 36
So long as the business was subject to comprehensive regulations,
administrative agencies could perform warrantless inspections
without any suspicion of a violation. 37
Finally, in New York v. Burger, the Supreme Court upheld the
warrantless inspection of a junkyard, and established the current
framework for determining the constitutionality of warrantless
administrative searches. 38 Under Burger and its progeny, the Court
has determined that suspicionless inspections are proper without an
administrative warrant so long as: (1) the state has a substantial
interest in regulating the industry or activity; (2) the regulations could
not be effectively enforced if the officials needed reasonable
suspicion of a violation before inspection; and (3) the persons or
businesses to be searched are engaged in an industry or activity that
reduces the reasonable expectation of privacy so that those parties

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 536-37.
See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
See, e.g., Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 75, 77 (permitting surprise inspections of retail
alcohol businesses).
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981).
Id. at 605-06.
Id. at 600.
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03, 707-08, 712 (1987).
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have notice that they are subject to random inspection within
reasonable time, place, and scope limitations. 39
B.

An Unfair Hunt? Warrantless Administrative Searches in the
Great Outdoors

Due to its vast land and abundant wildlife, Minnesota's courts have
seen frequent disputes over warrantless administrative searches of
hunters and anglers; 40 however, this is not solely a Minnesota
controversy. 41 Many states have wrestled with the parameters of
game wardens' search authority, as inspections once reserved for
notorious industries now are executed against private citizens merely
enjoying themselves in the great outdoors. 42
States across the country have comprehensive regulatory schemes
to preserve their wildlife populations, dictating everything from
hunting and fishing seasons to proper equipment. 43 Consequently,
under the administrative search exception, game wardens have the
authority to inspect hunters' and anglers' property, without suspicion
of a violation. 44
Many suspicionless inspections performed by game wardens are
fairly innocuous, such as requests to produce licenses or tagged game
at checkpoints. 45 Such interactions are expected and generally do not

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.
44.
45.

Burger, 482 U.S. at 707-11; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 627 (1989) (expanding warrantless searches to employees of industries that are
regulated to ensure safety); Nat'! Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665-67, 62, 679 (1989) (expanding warrantless drug testing for U.S. Customs
employees who apply for certain positions).
See, e.g., State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 7, 9 (Minn. 2003); State v. Larsen, 637
N.W.2d 315, 317 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Krenz, 634 N.W.2d 231, 235-36
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
See, e.g., Tarabochia v. Adkins, No. Cl0-5197BHS, 2011 WL 3475492, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 9, 2011); People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 251 (Cal. 2011); State v.
Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 776 (Mont. 2002).
See, e.g., Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256, 262-63; State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d 423, 430
(Or. 1980); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724-25 (S.D. 1979); Monroe v.
State, 253 S.W.2d 734, 734-36 (Tenn. 1952).
See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 258-59, 262-63 (discussing the administrative search
exception's application to fish and game enforcement).
See United States v. Fraire, 575 F.3d 929, 930 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding game
checkpoint outside of a national park); United States v. Buehler, 793 F. Supp. 971,
975-76 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (upholding conviction for failure to exhibit fishing
license).
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spur confrontation or resistance. 46 Yet when game wardens attempt
to search boats, vehicles, and other property, the reasonableness of
the search comes into question. 47
For instance, in State v. Colosimo, a game warden and an angler
argued over the warden's authority to search the anglers' boat for fish
while the boat was parked on land waiting for portage. 48 The game
warden cited the angler for refusing an inspection, and the angler
challenged on grounds that the game warden lacked probable cause to
search the boat,49 which justified his refusal of the search. 50
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the angler's
conviction. 51 The Court stressed that the state's regulatory scheme
provided for suspicionless fish inspections and that such measures
were the only reasonable way to enforce the recreational fishing
regulations. 52 Further, the Court held that Colosimo did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the rear platform of his boat. 53
Hence, the game warden would not have exceeded his authority to
search for fish in that limited area. 54
Similarly, in State v. Boyer, the Montana Supreme Court likewise
upheld a warden's authority to search a fishing boat with only
reasonable suspicion of a violation. 55 There, the Court upheld an
angler's conviction for possession of unlawfully killed game fish,
over the angler's contention that the game warden physically intruded
onto his fishing boat without probable cause. 56 The dispute arose
when the game warden stepped onto the transom57 of Boyer's boat to

46.

47.
48.
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Malin J. Stearns, Note, It's Good to Be the Game Warden: State v. Boyer and the
Erosion of Privacy Protection for Montana Sportsmen, 65 MONT. L. REv. 187, 206
(2004).
See Witty, supra note 11, at 173-80.
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 2-3. Portage is the process of transporting boats and gear
across land between two bodies of water. Witty, supra note 11, at 156 n.19.
Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d at 2-3. Colosimo, an attorney, argued that under section
97A.215 of the Minnesota Statutes, the warden could not search Colosimo's boat
without probable cause of a fish or game violation. /d.
/d.
Jd.at9.
!d. at 6.
/d.
/d. at 6-7.
State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 773, 777 (Mont. 2002).
/d. at 773-74.
In nautical terms, the transom is the exterior platform at the rear of the boat. /d. at
773.
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inspect Boyer's live well58 to determine whether the angler exceeded
the daily catch limit. 59 Boyer argued that despite the extensive
regulatory scheme for recreational fishing, 60 under section
87.1.506(1)(b) of the Montana Code, a warden may only perform a
warrantless search of an angler's property with probable cause to
believe that a game violation took place. 61
The Court, however, disagreed. 62 Rather than consider the
warden's actions as a search, the Court held that the warden merely
performed an administrative inspection, limited to reasonable places
where the angler would store his fish. 63 Consequently, the warden's
entry onto the boat on less than probable cause was constitutional as a
warrantless administrative search. 64
Ultimately, Boyer and Colosimo demonstrate the breadth of the
warrantless administrative search exception. 65 In both Minnesota and
Montana, state laws purported to limit game wardens' authority to
perform certain warrantless searches only upon probable cause. 66
The courts, however, stressed the need for wardens to inspect for fish
and game violations. 67 Accordingly, the courts determined that the
anglers lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in their boats, and
thus the administrative inspections limited to searches only for fish
were proper. 68

58.
59.
60.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.
68.

A live well is a container in a boat used to hold caught fish in water in order to
preserve freshness. Witty, supra note 11, at 159 n.47.
Boyer, 42 P.3d at 773.
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN.§ 87.1.502(3) (West 2007) (authorizing game wardens to
enforce fish and game licensure); id. § 87.1.502(6) (mandating the production of fish
and game at the warden's request).
Boyer, 42 P.3d at 775.
/d. at 775-76.
/d.
/d.
See Witty, supra note 11, at 180-89.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97A.215, subdiv. 1 (West 2009) (noting that wardens may
search vehicles and containers upon probable cause of possession of unlawful fish or
game); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 87.1.506(1)(b)(2007) (noting that wardens may search
without a warrant upon probable cause of a game violation).
Witty, supra note 11, at 180-88.
!d.; see also People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 249-51 (Cal. 2011).
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Ill. HOW TO PRESERVE PRIVACY RIGHTS FOR HUNTERS
AND ANGLERS
A.

Constitutional Challenges to Warrantless Administrative
Searches are Dead-Ends

Outside of a brief mention in Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion in Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court has yet to discuss
the constitutionality of game wardens' warrantless inspections. 69
However, cases in state appellate courts and federal trial courts have
wrestled with a game warden's authority to search for fish and game
violations without a warrant or probable cause. 70 With a few specific
exceptions/ 1 the majority of these cases have sided with the
government, finding that the state's interest in preserving its wildlife
is sufficient cause to permit the warrantless inspections. 72
Although commentators and dissenting judges may disagree,
claiming these intrusions to be unconstitutional, 73 game warden
inspections are almost always upheld under the warrantless
administrative search exception. 74 Typically, these inspections meet
the first two prongs under Burger-a substantial state interest and no
adequate alternative for enforcement-with little controversy. 75
Fishing and game laws are nearly ubiquitous, 76 and most states
consider those regulations vital in order to preserve wildlife
populations for current populations and future generations. 77 Further,
69.

70.

71.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664 (1979) (Blaclunun, J., concurring) (clarifying
that the holding of the case did not address the constitutionality of "the necessarily
somewhat individualized and perhaps largely random examinations by game wardens
in the performance of their duties").
See Edwin J. Butterfoss & Joseph L. Daly, State v. Colosimo: Minnesota Anglers'
Freedom from Unreasonable Search and Seizures Becomes "The One That Got
Away," 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 527, 545 (2004).
Generally, courts have recognized a higher expectation of privacy in dwelling-like
locations, and therefore have not permitted game wardens to perform suspicionless
administrative searches of ice fishing houses. See State v. Krenz, 634 N.W.2d 231,
234 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Larsen, 637 N.W.2d. 315, 316-20 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001).
See discussion supra Part II.B.
See, e.g., State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 9-13 (Minn. 2003) (Page, J., dissenting).
See Witty, supra note 11, at 175-76.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
See Witty, supra note 11, at 152-54. Minnesota has even gone so far as to protect
recreational hunting and fishing in its state constitution, declaring, "the taking of game
and fish are a valued part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people
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in the fish and game context, realistic enforcement requires that game
wardens have the ability to perform suspicionless-albeit limitedsearches and seizures. 78
Accordingly, most disagreement over warrantless administrative
searches against anglers and hunters lies in the third Burger prong,
namely, that inspections be limited in time, place, and scope to areas
where the person to be searched lacks a reasonable expectation of
privacy. 79 Much of the disagreement centers on the dissenters' belief
that courts have used the administrative search exception to
completely erode any expectation of privacy for anglers and hunters,
despite statutes to the contrary. 80
For example, in Boyer, the dissent argued that the majority
improperly focused on Boyer's expectation of privacy in the fish he
possessed. 81 The dissent argued that the primary inquiry should have
centered solely on Boyer's expectation of privacy in his boat and live
well. 82 Commentators note that the majority was able to justify the
warrantless intrusion onto the boat because it is widely accepted that
anglers must display their catch upon demand. 83
Another argument against the fish and game search exception is
that the definition of the anglers' and hunters' reasonable expectation
of privacy is disconnected with the roots of the warrantless
administrative search exception. 84 Proponents of hunters' and
anglers' rights note that, whereas the fishing and hunting cases
involve individuals engaging in recreation, the earlier administrative
search cases focused on industries and businesses. 85 Further,
proponents of greater privacy protections argue that extending the
administrative search exception to all closely regulated activities
should be invalid, since the courts have declined to extend the

78.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

and shall be managed by law and regulation for the public good." MINN. CONST. art.
13, § 12.
See Witty, supra note 11, at 153, 162-63. Enforcing fishing and game laws is a
difficult task, even with the administrative search exception. See id. at 153. Hunters
and anglers typically operate away from prying eyes, and game wardens are expected
to patrol vast expanses of outdoor terrain. See People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247, 26162 (Cal. 2011). Further, without close inspection, it is difficult to develop reasonable
suspicion that an angler or hunter has procured unlawful game, rather than acceptable
species. /d. Thus, a probable cause or reasonable suspicion requirement for fish and
game inspections would render enforcement nearly impossible. /d.
See Butterfoss & Daly, supra note 70, at 545.
Stearns, supra note 46, at 207-09.
State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 781-82 (Mont. 2002) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
/d.
Steams, supra note 46, at 210--13.
See, e.g., State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 13-16 (Minn. 2003) (Page, J., dissenting).
/d.
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administrative search exception to roving vehicle stops to check for
licenses or drunk drivers, even though driving is just as regulated as
fishing and hunting. 86
Although arguments to the contrary are compelling, it appears
fruitless to contend that the wardens' suspicionless searches are
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied certiorari for Colosimo
and has yet to address the issue. 87 State and lower federal courts have
upheld the majority of the warrantless administrative game warden
searches. 88 In fact, absent specific state laws that narrowly define the
game warden's search authority, 89 or a search of a structure that is
akin to a home, 90 the courts have overwhelmingly sided with the
game wardens. 91 Therefore, advocates for anglers' and hunters'
privacy should not focus on attacking the exception's vitality in court
but, instead, should propose other methods with a greater chance for
success. 92
B.

Raising the Floor: Using State Constitutions to Protect Privacy

Not every state's constitution mirrors the protections of the United
States Constitution. 93 Although states may not mandate a narrower
scope of protection, they may "raise the floor" and offer greater
protection than the baseline rights under the United States
Constitution. 94 This practice is most notably used by states that
86.

87.
88.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

94.

!d. Justice Page claims that under the administrative search exception's expansion,
anglers and hunters have fewer privacy rights than drunk drivers, who are protected
against suspicionless stops by roving patrols. !d. at 13.
State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 988 (2004).
See, e.g., Elzey v. State, 519 S.E.2d 751,755 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Maikhio,
253 P.3d 247, 250 (Cal. 2011); State v. Keehner, 425 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1988);
Drane v. State, 493 So.2d 294, 297-98 (Miss. 1986); State v. Tourtillott, 618 P.2d
423, 427-30 (Or. 1980); State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724-25 (S.D. 1979);
Monroe v. State, 253 S.W.2d 734, 735-36 (Tenn. 1952).
See Witty, supra note 11, at 173-75.
!d. at 169.
!d. at 175-80.
See infra Part III. C.!.
See Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of
10,000 Lakes: Minnesota's Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the
United States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REv. 865, 894-95 (2007). For
a discussion of the mechanics of achieving state constitutional amendment to protect
individual rights, see G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Getting From
Here to There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State
Constitutional Reform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1075-77 (2005).
See Jeffrey A. Parness, American State Constitutional Equalities, 45 GONZ. L. REv.
773, 788 (2010).
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provide for broader equal protection rights and anti-discrimination
measures. 95 Some commentators recognize that the practice of
providing greater individual rights through state constitutional
provisions could also be used to offer broader search and seizure
rights than those afforded under the Fourth Amendment. 96
Notably, Montana's state constitution provides for greater privacy
protection than under the Fourth Amendment. 97 Under the Montana
Constitution, "[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the wellbeing of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing
of a compelling state interest. " 98 In several instances, such as thermal
imaging99 and the automobile exception, 100 the Montana Supreme
Court has interpreted this provision to grant greater privacy
protection than under the Fourth Amendment. 101
In the warrantless administrative search context, however,
Montana's expanded privacy protection has yet to gain traction. 102
Because game warden administrative searches are based on the
state's interest in preserving its wildlife populations, courts have
consistently valued the compelling state interest in wildlife
preservation over the privacy of Montanan anglers and hunters. 103 So
long as courts view wildlife preservation as a compelling state
interest, a more expansive state constitutional measure beyond what
Montana has provided would be required to offer anglers and hunters
some greater privacy protection against suspicionless searches. 104

95.

96.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

!d. at 789. Scholars recognize four approaches that states take toward analyzing
individual rights: (1) lockstep-where the state follows the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution; (2) interstitial-where the state will look to its own
state constitution only after analyzing the U.S. constitutional interpretation; (3) dual
sovereignty-where the state court considers the federal and state constitution as
equals; and (4) primacy-where the state constitution reigns. Anderson & Oseid,
supra note 93, at 879-80.
See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 93, at 894-95; cf Jack L. Landau, Should State
Courts Depart from the Fourth Amendment? Search and Seizure, State Constitutions,
and the Oregon Experience, 77 MISS. L.J. 369, 370 (2007) (arguing that states should
not depart from Federal Fourth Amendment case Jaw).
See Steams, supra note 46, at 191.
MONT. CONST. art. II,§ 10.
State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 191-192 (Mont. 1977).
State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456, 468-69 (Mont. 2000).
See Steams, supra note 46, at 191.
!d. at 213.
State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771, 774-75 (Mont. 2002).
See Steams, supra note 46, at 213.
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Unfortunately for those who wish to expand individual privacy
rights, state constitutional reform is not an easy process. 105 It can be
difficult to motivate state legislators to undertake an involved task
like state constitutional reform, especially for such a specialized class
as recreational anglers and hunters. 106
Further, many states simply interpret their own constitutions in
lock-step fashion with the United States Constitution. 107 Maryland
courts, for instance, interpret Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights as being in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment. 108
Thus, in states that do not stray from the United States Constitution,
efforts aimed at state constitutional reform would likely fail to
improve individual privacy rights for anglers and hunters. 109

C. A Pragmatic Balance ofPrivacy and Preservation
1. The Suspicion Solution
There is a "nuclear option" 110 for hunters and anglers to achieve
heightened privacy protection.
Through deregulation of the
regulatory schemes for recreational fishing and hunting, anglers and
hunters could remove the state's interest in their activity, hence
crippling the game wardens' administrative search authority. 111 Such
drastic measures would be a gross overcorrection, undermining noble
efforts to preserve vital wildlife populations. 112 The cost of greatly
reducing fish and game regulations would be too steep a price, as

105. See Vladimir Kogan, The Irony of Comprehensive State Constitutional Reform, 41
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 882, (20 10).
106. See id. at 890-91.
107. See Anderson & Oseid, supra note 93, at 880-81.
108. See Jones v. State, 407 Md. 33, 46 n.2, 962 A.2d 393, 400 n.2 (2008). The Latin
phrase, "in pari materia," means "[o]n the same subject" or "relating to the same
matter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004).
109. Cf Anderson & Oseid, supra note 93, at 881 (criticizing the limitation of the
"lockstep" approach for state constitutions).
II 0. "Nuclear option," often used in political discussions, refers to the most drastic
solution to a problem. Cf Stephanie Dinan, Senate 'Nukes' Amendments: Reid's
'Nuclear Option' vs. GOP Likely to Heighten Acrimony, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011,
at A4, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/6/reid-usesnuclear-option-block-gop-amendments/?page=all (discussing a drastic legislative
strategy to forward a particular agenda).
111. Cf supra text accompanying note 39 (explaining the three requirements under New
York v. Burger for a warrantless administrative search).
112. Witty, supra note 11, at 192-93.
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most states would balk at subjecting fragile wildlife populations to
the whims of their citizens. 113
Yet privacy advocates fear a slippery slope of unchecked searches
performed at the whim of a game warden, which they believe will
proliferate in the wake of Colosimo and Boyer. 114 A middle path is
required in order to strike a reasonable balance between privacy and
preservation. 115
The Supreme Court of California demonstrated the possibility of
such a middle path when it upheld a game warden's warrantless
administrative inspection in People v. Maikhio. 116 There, a game
warden spotted Maikhio from a distance using a hand line to fish
what appeared to be a lobster. 117 The warden observed Maikhio put
his catch into a black bag and then return to his car to leave the
pier. 118 The warden subsequently stopped Maikhio's vehicle and
developed suspicion of a violation after questioning Maikhio. 119
Then the warden executed a search of the vehicle and found a spiny
lobster, which was out of season. 120
Maikhio was charged for possessing a spiny lobster during closed
season and for failing to exhibit his catch when commanded by the
game warden. 121 Maikhio contended that the warden's search was
unconstitutional, as he was in his vehicle attempting to leave the pier
and the warden did not have reasonable suspicion of a fishing
violation when he stopped the vehicle. 122 The Court, however, sided
with the game warden. 123
In holding that the game warden's actions were constitutional, the
Maikhio Court examined the state's fish and game codes to determine
the scope of the warden's authority to perform warrantless stops and
searches. 124 Under section 1006 of the California Fish and Game
Code, wardens may search for fish and game only in places where the
fish and game may be stored or hidden. 125 Further, under section
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

!d.
See, e.g., Steams, supra note 46, at 213.
See Witty, supra note II, at 189-93.
People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247,250 (Cal. 2011).
/d.at251-52.
/d. at 249-50.
See id. at 250.
/d.
!d. at 253.
/d.
/d. at 250.
!d. at 254-55.
/d. Section 1006 provides that wardens may inspect, "[a]ll boats, markets, stores and
other buildings, except dwellings, and all receptacles, except the clothing actually
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2012 of the Fish and Game Code, hunters and anglers must exhibit
their game, licenses, and equipment upon demand of a game
warden. 126
The Court interpreted sections 1006 and 2012 as granting statutory
authority for game wardens to make brief stops of individuals as long
as the wardens had reasonable suspicion that the person recently was
fishing or hunting. 127 Even without suspicion of a fish or game
violation, the Court held that a stop is permissible for the purpose of
demanding display of proper licensure for any fish or game that the
stopped person possessed. 128 Further, the Court held that such stops
could be made on vehicles, so long as the warden reasonably believed
that the occupants had recently been hunting or fishing. 129
Because the game warden developed probable cause before
searching Maikhio' s vehicle, the Court refrained from deciding
whether section 1006 authorized warrantless searches without
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of a violation. 130 Yet the facts
behind the Maikhio decision 131 suggest a simple procedure for future
warrantless administrative searches in the fish and game context. 132
Namely, that any additional search of a vehicle or container would
only be permissible if the warden developed suspicion of a violation
during the initial, lawful stop. Thus, under the "Suspicion Solution,"
had the game warden in Maikhio failed to develop probable cause or
reasonable suspicion of a violation during his stop of Maikhio, the

126.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

worn by a person at the time of inspection, where birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or
amphibia may be stored, placed, or held for sale or storage." CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
§ 1006 (West 1998).
Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 255. Section 2012 provides that:
All licenses, tags, and the birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or
amphibians taken or otherwise dealt with under this code, and any
device or apparatus designed to be, and capable of being, used to
take birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or amphibians shall be
exhibited upon demand to any person authorized by the
department to enforce this code or any law relating to the
protection and conservation of birds, mammals, fish, reptiles, or
amphibians.
CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2012 (West Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256.
/d. at 255-56.
/d. at 256.
!d. at 266 n.18.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
Notably, the game warden only searched Maikhio's vehicle and bag after Maikhio
lied to the game warden about poaching off the pier that evening. Maikhio, 253 P .3d
at 266.
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game warden would not have been authorized to search Maikhio's
vehicle or bag.
Free from the empty provisions claiming that searches may only be
made upon probable cause of a violation, as in Montana and
Minnesota, 133 the Maikhio Court's interpretation of California's fish
and game laws struck a more sensible balance of preservation and
privacy. Whereas the Boyer and Colosimo courts established
seemingly discretionless authority for administrative searches of any
place that fish and game may be located, 134 the Maikhio Court
established a clear procedure for wardens to effectuate stops of
suspected hunters and anglers. 135
The Colosimo and Boyer holdings were troubling for dissenters
because of the courts' seemingly selective statutory enforcemene 36
and willingness to embolden game wardens with discretionless search
authority. 137 The Maikhio Court's interpretation of the state's fish
and game laws suggests that statutes can be tailored to not only
ensure regulatory enforcement, 138 but prevent situations such as in
Boyer and Colosimo where the game warden had the authority to
perform a suspicionless inspection of the angler's boat. 139
Ultimately, the Maikhio holding demonstrates that, with specific
fishing and game codes, a state can narrow the authority of game
wardens without jeopardizing the preservation of a state's wildlife
population by severely limiting wardens' enforcement capabilities. 140
States across the country face an ongoing struggle between their
preservation goals and privacy concerns. 141 Rather than allow the
courts to further expand the administrative search exception, state
legislatures should expand upon the Maikhio holding and strive to
better define a game warden's warrantless administrative search
authority. The California Supreme Court's interpretation of the
state's fish and game laws offers a measured and pragmatic way to
appease both sides of a contentious issue.

133. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 97A.215 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 87-1-502(6).
134. See discussion supra Part II.B (examining the Boyer and Colosimo holdings).
135. See Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256.
136. See, e.g., Butterfoss & Daly, supra note 70, at 549; Steams supra note 46, at 206-11
(explaining how the decision in Boyer is inconsistent with Montana's constitution and
statutory authority).
137. See Butterfoss & Daly, supra note 70, at 554.
138. See Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256.
139. See supra Part II.B (discussing the State v. Boyer and State v. Colosimo holdings).
140. See Maikhio, 253 P.3d at 256.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.

2013]

The Hidden Cost of Rod and Rifle

817

2. Applying the Suspicion Solution to Maryland's Fish and Game
Laws
Maryland may not boast 10,000 lakes like Minnesota or cover as
broad a territory as California and Montana, but the Chesapeake Bay
is unique and precious to the state's history and tradition. 142 In order
to protect the fragile estuary and its wildlife denizens, Maryland has
comprehensive statutes and regulations to oversee the abundant
recreational fishing and hunting that occurs in the state. 143 In light of
recent environmental pressures, Maryland has altered its enforcement
of fishing laws and regulations. 144 State legislators have tried to
address problems of poaching fish out of season and fishing without
proper equipment. 145 Although new equipment may aid game
wardens in the fight against improper fishing tactics, Department of
Natural Resources officials will likely have situations in which they
must directly interact with individuals enjoying the bay's waters. 146
Such interactions could lead to unwelcome interactions between
game wardens and anglers, and disputes over privacy rights could
arise. 147
Similar to Boyer and Colosimo, Maryland's fish and game laws
seem to provide contradictory standards regarding a game warden's
search authority. 148 Although hunters and anglers are mandated to
exhibit their catches, licenses, and equipment upon demand by a

142. The Chesapeake Bay, the largest estuary in North America, is home to 3,600 different
plant and animal species. Bay Area Facts, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION,
http://www.cbf.org/page.aspx?pid=433 (last visited June 10, 2013).
143. See, e.g., Mo. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. §§ 4-101 to -1211 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp.
2011) (Maryland's Fish and Fisheries Codes); id. §§ 10-101 to -1203 (LexisNexis
2007 & Supp. 2011) (Maryland's Wildlife Codes).
144. See Candus Thomas, War on Rocliflsh Poaches: Police Have new Tools, new Laws, to
Avoid Repeat of Last Year, BALT. SUN, Jan. 5, 2012, at A2.
145. !d.
146. See Candus Thomas, State Proposes New Policies to Prevent Rocliflsh Poaching,
BALT. SUN, July 15, 2011, at A3.
147. Maryland natural resources officials face a continuing problem with unlawful conduct
by recreational anglers. See Don Markus, 60 Recreational Fishermen Face Loss of
License, BALT. SUN, Sept. 13, 2011, at Dl.
148. Compare MONT. CODE ANN.§ 87.1.506(l)(b) (West 2007) (searches of anglers only
upon probable cause), and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97A.215, subdiv. 1 (West 2009)
(searches of anglers only upon probable cause), with Mo. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. §§ 41204 (LexisNexis 2005), 10-1104 (LexisNexis 2007) (probable cause required to
search anglers and hunters respectively).
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game warden, 149 there are also provisions that prohibit warrantless
searches without probable cause. 150
Maryland has not had such a dispute go to an appellate court;
however, Maryland could set a dangerous precedent, as occurred in
Colosimo, based on the state's similarly contradictory fish and game
laws. 151 Thus, the Maryland General Assembly should amend its fish
and game laws to reflect the procedures adopted in Maikhio. Rather
than promise no intrusion on less than probable cause, 152 the law
should provide that wardens are free to stop suspected anglers or
hunters to demand exhibition of licenses and any fish or game that
the person possess. 153 Then, under the Suspicion Solution, game
wardens could only conduct a more invasive search after developing
independent suspicion of a violation. 154
This would permit the game wardens to carry out their authority to
inspect licenses and wildlife while keeping a barrier in place before
the warden could search a vehicle or container. 155 Without this
procedure, as in Colosimo and Boyer, Maryland hunters and anglers
could be subjected to suspicionless entries onto their boats or into
their vehicles merely because they have been hunting or fishing. 156
Under the Suspicion Solution, this would add an extra procedural
step to ensure that wardens' inspections are properly limited without
placing undue burdens on enforcement. 157
Ultimately, it would be in Maryland's best interest to follow the
Suspicion Solution and adopt more narrowly defined fish and game
laws. 158 As wildlife resources in the Chesapeake Bay and in the
western mountains dwindle, state officials face greater pressures to
enforce fish and game laws in both the recreational and commercial
arenas. 159 Thus, a measured approach, as utilized in Maikhio, would
be a prudent path for Maryland to follow in order to maintain its

149. Mo. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 10-306 (display of a hunter's license); id. § 4-610
(display of angler's license).
150. /d. §§ 4-1204, 10-1104 (probable cause required to search fishers and hunters
respectively).
15 i. See discussion supra Part II. B.
152. NAT. REs. §§ 4-1204, 10-1104 (probable cause required to search anglers and hunters
respectively).
153. See People v. Maikhio, 253 P.3d 247,256 (Cal. 2011).
154. See discussion supra Part III.C.l.
155. See discussion supra Part III. C. I.
156. See discussion supra Part II. B.
157. See discussion supra Part III.C.l.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 146-52.
159. See Markus, supra note 147; Thomas, supra note 147.
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anglers' and hunters' privacy while ensuring enforcement of its fish
and game laws. 160
IV. CONCLUSION
It can be difficult to navigate the delicate balance between privacy
rights and the need for law enforcement to investigate wrongdoing. 161
As this comment demonstrates, the balancing act is especially
difficult when nontraditional law enforcement, such as game
wardens, attempt to execute their duties to preserve vulnerable
natural resources. 162
A uniform approach to this national issue would be a futile
exercise. 163 Not only do states have divergent approaches to the
authority afforded to game wardens, but recreational hunting and
fishing are valued differently as well. 164 Ultimately, however, the
Suspicion Solution likely is the most practical approach to address
the issue. 165
The emphasis on narrowly drawn statutes and
regulations would enable the model to work in any state. 166 It could
accommodate one state's preference for greater wildlife protection
and another state's preference for greater privacy for anglers and
hunters. 167
Maryland should examine its fish and game laws. 168 Although
there have apparently been no legal disputes over the inconsistencies
in the law, that does not mean that concerned citizens should refrain
from being proactive. 169 As Maryland is home to the largest estuary
in North America, 170 opportunities abound for interaction between
game wardens and anglers. 171
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

165.
166.
16 7.
168.
169.
170.
171.

See discussion supra Part Ill. C. I.
See discussion supra Part II. B.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
See discussion supra Parts liLA-B.
For instance, not every state finds it necessary to provide for the preservation of
recreational fishing and hunting in its state constitution, as does Minnesota. See
MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 12. For a detailed survey of various state constitutional
provisions regarding fish and game rights, see Jeffrey Omar Ussman, The Game is
Afoot: Constitutionalizing the Right to Hunt and Fish in the Tennessee Constitution,
77 TENN. L. REv. 57, 77-90 (2009).
See discussion supra Part Ill. C.
See discussion supra Part III. C.
See discussion supra Part III. C.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
See CFB Action Center, CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, http://capwiz.com/cbf/home/
(last visited June 10, 2013); discussion supra Part II.B.
See Bay Area Facts, supra note 142.
Nearly 10 million people live on, or near, the shores of the Chesapeake Bay. !d.
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Rather than waiting to react to a future dispute, state legislators and
regulators could amend the state's fish and game statutes and
regulations to ensure that the game wardens can protect the state's
rich wildlife without sacrificing reasonable boundaries on individual
privacy rights. 172 Failure to do so could result in a dangerous
precedent that could be difficult to remedy in the future. 173
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172. See discussion supra Part III.C.l.
173. Cf Butterfoss & Daly, supra note 70, at 545-46 (providing examples of how state
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